I tried to trackback, but couldn't get the TB page to open. *sigh*

Nonetheless, because the Luftwaffe couldn't gain air superiority Hitler called off the invasion. If he tried it anyway, then the Royal Navy would have given him what for.

I think rbj has it about right. The fact that the Luftwaffe couldn't get air superiority meant that the RN had the freedom of the seas. Had the RAF not been able to hold the Luftwaffe at bay, the Germans could have made the Channel a killing zone for any RN vessel, which would have cleared the way for the barges to cross to a landing. The model for that approach was in the Pacific, where the US established air superiority and basically nullified the Japanese Navy, even though the initial attack at Pearl Harbor decimated the surface fleet. The battle of the Pacific showed the vulnerability of surface vessels to unopposed air power. The Pacific war turned at the battle of Midway, where the Japanese fleet lost a major portion of its air cover. From that point on, the Japanese Navy was essentially able only to defend itself, not project power forward.

I gather that the main issue is not so much whether Hitler could have invaded as long as the Royal Navy was viable (obviously, he could not). Instead, it seems to be whether the Luftwaffe, victorious over the RAF, could then have defeated the RN unhindered.

To destroy the German invasion flotilla, the RN would basically only need smaller ships - destroyers and corvettes and such - careering around at extremely high speed. They would not be attempting to project power forward, but would be playing a strictly defensive roll.

Two other factors that don't actually get mentioned in the news story and that might have an impact. First, the German barges would only be able to travel at very slow speeds. Coming from their bases on the French and Dutch coasts, it would take them many hours to cross over, giving the Brits ample time and warning to dash out and begin their counter assaults. This says nothing of the trecherous currents, banks and other navigational dangers the Germans would have to overcome. In other words, they would be extremely vulnerable.

Second, there are very, very few places on the English coast where any kind of massive landing could have taken place, given various combinations of shoals, cliffs and harbor fortifications. The Germans would have been forced to concentrate their flotillas at these spots, thus giving the Brits maximum opportunity for breaking them up.

I'm simply repeating here what I've read, not arguing its merit, but I wonder if these factors impact on the comparison of this battle with the U.S./Japanese confrontations of the Pacific?

"Even if the RAF had been defeated the fleet would still have been able to defeat any invasion because fast ships at sea could easily manoeuvre and "were pretty safe from air attack"."

Right. How'd that work out for Repulse and the Prince of Wales? Bismarck was sunk because of damage inflicted by obsolete biplanes. Without air cover, the Royal Navy would have been hard-pressed to close with the invasion fleet. The German surface fleet could have actually been used for a purpose as a screening force (assuming they could leave their ports and rendezvous with the landing craft).

The Royal Navy was never exposed to the full brunt of the Luftwaffe, so no one will ever know how this would have played out. No one can pin down Hitler's state of mind concerning ordering the invasion of England to take place, so it's all speculation.

At the time, Churchill seemed to believe that the RAF had done the country a singular service, regardless of the propaganda benefit of claiming victory in the Battle of Britain.

Chris, your comment about propaganda was particularly appropriate. The English population had watched the Battle of Britain occur over their heads--they could see the contrails, see the defeated aircraft plummeting, see the parachutes. So Churchill did capitalize on that visual experience to declare a victory that the people desperately needed.

Robbo the LB, the same currents, speed of vessel, banks, navigational challenges faced the Allies on D-Day, but with air cover and superior air forces to protect them from the Luftwaffe, they carried it off. Similarly, the French coast only has a few spots suitable for a major landing, and Hitler had defended them pretty well. The lack of air power to strike the landing forces on the beach was a major factor in the success of D-Day. In all of history, there has not been an amphibious landing anywhere that was vigorously opposed by air power. The military planners know that the beach is a killing zone and that to make the losses acceptable you must control the air, both to keep the enemy air force off the troops and to use friendly air power to strike at the enemy from above to keep their heads down. For those reasons, landings have to wait until air superiority is established over the beach.

In the Pacific, because the Japanese lost so many carriers at Midway and the huge distances that exist between the island groups the air power balance shifted to the Allies. That shift then allowed for landings on beaches to capture airfields, or islands on which airfields could be built, with only token air resistance. The Allies pounded fixed bases and chased the Japanese fleet into home waters far from the front. The carrier-based US forces could then pound on the enemy islands to soften them up for the landing forces. There are films from the invasions showing aircraft hitting targets on the beach literally seconds before the landing craft beached.

Kamikazi pilots had longer range (one way), so they became a fearsome force when they appeared. Their range was beyond the ability of the Allies to strike back, so the forces were forced into point defense, which is usually a losing proposition. Fortunately, kamikazi is a diminishing resource. It took time to train them to fly, and each pilot was good for only one mission. Those factors limited the impact of the kamikazi.

I'm not a historian, but I did spend 20 years flying Navy bombers, so the history of Navy air power is an interest.

I think that a German invasion in 1940 was unlikely to succeed, even if the Germans gained air superiority.

But consider if the Germans achieved air supremacy and maintained it for something like a year. The major British ports on the Channel Coast could be burned to the ground by bombers, and Britain's industrial centers badly damaged. Combine that with a flood of U-Boats and the Germans get stronger every single year. 1940, no. 1941, probably not. 1942? Maybe. 1943?

I think the Battle of Britain destroyed a key that Hitler could have used to slowly open a lock. Without the key, he had no chance at turning the lock. He may well have failed in an invasion had he defeated the RAF, but the RAF winning completely foreclosed any chance of it. Game, set, match.

Churchill was also worried about Britain's east coast as an invasion spot -- not so well fortified, and a lot of flat ground. Pick a spot form the mouth of the Thames north to the Wash, and it's hard to see how Britain's meager ground forces stop the Panzers once they're ashore.

I think your other readers have sufficiently addressed the folly of this theory, but a couple more points need to be driven home:

Dunkirk is a poor example with which to support this theory, because the Luftwaffe had not established over Dinkirk anything like the kind of air dominance they'd have enjoyed had they trounced the RAF in the Battle of Britain. While they did control the sk, they had not swept the RAF from it, and RAF hurricanes were flying sorties over dunkirk. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was operating at the far end of its range -- later, they would have airbases on the French cast from which to fly.

This theory was doomed by Mitchell between the wars, long before the battle was ever engaged, and the aforementioned Repulse and Prince of Wales (not to mention Taranto, Pearl Harbor, etc.) drove the nails in the coffin lid. Had the Luftwaffe won the battle of Britain, they would have been flying mass sorties from the French coast with impunity, and no RN ship of ANY size could have sailed with anything like safetly within flight range of the French coast, let alone from channel ports. Even fast destroyers would be sunk before they left the harbor.