The World Wondered

A little more poetry appropriate to the day:

Half a league, half a league, Half a league onward, All in the valley of Death Rode the six hundred. "Forward, the Light Brigade! "Charge for the guns!" he said: Into the valley of Death Rode the six hundred.

"Forward, the Light Brigade!"
Was there a man dismay'd?
Not tho' the soldier knew
Someone had blunder'd:
Their's not to make reply,
Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon in front of them
Volley'd and thunder'd;
Storm'd at with shot and shell,
Boldly they rode and well,
Into the jaws of Death,
Into the mouth of Hell
Rode the six hundred.

Flash'd all their sabres bare,
Flash'd as they turn'd in air,
Sabring the gunners there,
Charging an army, while
All the world wonder'd:
Plunged in the battery-smoke
Right thro' the line they broke;
Cossack and Russian
Reel'd from the sabre stroke
Shatter'd and sunder'd.
Then they rode back, but not
Not the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon behind them
Volley'd and thunder'd;
Storm'd at with shot and shell,
While horse and hero fell,
They that had fought so well
Came thro' the jaws of Death
Back from the mouth of Hell,
All that was left of them,
Left of six hundred.

When can their glory fade?
O the wild charge they made!
All the world wondered.
Honor the charge they made,
Honor the Light Brigade,
Noble six hundred.

Yes, today is the anniversary of the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854 during the Crimean War. Basil Seal has more.

I use that particular language from Tennyson's poem in the post's title because it closely resembles that of a telegram sent by Admiral Chester Nimitz to Admiral William "Bull" Halsey on October 25, 1944 during the Battle of Leyte Gulf:

TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS

In fact, the language was added to the message as any anti-interception security measure and the receiving radioman did not realize it, but nonetheless this was Admiral Nimitz's query as to why on earth Halsey's heavy ships were not helping to defend against the Japanese attack against the American naval forces off the island of Samar. (The answer, as I noted yesterday, was Halsey's goosechase to the north after the Japanese carrier fleet.)

Because of Halsey's foolishness, in this action off Samar the only thing standing between Admiral Kurita's battlewagons and the U.S. beachhead at Leyte was Task Group 77.4, divided into three groups of small escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts known as Taffy 1, Taffy 2 and Taffy 3. This site picks up the action that day:

The little escort carriers were preparing for another day when, early in the morning of Oct. 25, lookouts on board ships of Taffy 3 spotted Admiral Takeo Kurita's heavy surface force attempting to enter Leyte Gulf and attack the transports and beachhead. What Taffy 3 faced were four battleships and six heavy cruisers. Outgunned and outmanned, the Jeeps and their accompanying destroyers and destroyer escorts did the only thing they could in the face of such overwhelming odds and firepower — they attacked.

Taffy 3, which would bear the brunt of the fighting, began launching aircraft and making smoke. Taffy 2 and Taffy 1, further away, began launching their aircraft to come to the aid of Taffy 3. No heavy American surface units or carriers were in the area; the Jeeps were on their own.

Aircraft from the Jeeps attacked and harassed the enemy, bombing and strafing. Pilots then made "dry" runs on the cruisers and battleships when they ran out of ammunition, in the hope of distracting the enemy gunners from shooting at the little carriers. The gutsy little destroyers, completely overmatched, bore in and carried out torpedo attacks, and fired at the massive battlewagons and cruisers with their relatively puny 5-inch battery guns. The escort carriers themselves were saved from utter destruction because of excellent maneuvering by their captains, and because, when hit, their thin armor permitted the Japanese shells to pass completely through without exploding.

Bold tactics on the part of the carriers, their planes and destroyers convinced Kurita that he had encountered a much larger force of heavy American surface ships and carriers. He had no idea that relatively little stood between his ships and the transports now unloading in Leyte Gulf.

With little knowledge of the situation, and with his ships widely dispersed after fending off the destroyer attacks, Kurita ordered his ships to break off the action and retire from the area. The fight, however, was still not over.

Following Kurita's withdrawal, ships of Taffy 2 and Taffy 3 came under attack from kamikazes, or Japanese suicide pilots. The kamikazes inflicted far greater damage on the little carriers than did Kurita's gunfire, which only managed to account for one carrier, USS Gambier Bay (CVE 73). Hits were scored on Santee, Suwanee, USS Kitkun Bay (CVE 71) and USS St. Lo (CVE 63). Of these four, St. Lo (left) was hit hardest, and she sank as a result.

To give you an idea of the guts with which the Americans fought, read this account of the destroyer U.S.S. Johnston (DD557), under the command of Cdr. Ernest Evans. The Johnston fought like a maniac until she was finally overwhelmed and pummeled into scrap. As she rolled over to head for the bottom, witnesses reported seeing the captain of a nearby Japanese destroyer salute her.

Interesting that two such awe-inspiring examples of gallantry necessitated by blunder should have occurred on the same day.